Difficulties in distinguishing veridical reports of experience from confabulations have implications for theories of consciousness. I develop some of these implications through a consideration of out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Do these variations indicate individual variation in experience or are they post-hoc confabulations, stories told by subjects to themselves in an attempt to make sense of the core phenomenology? I argue that no existent or possible evidence would be sufficient to favour one hypothesis over the other. How such evidence is interpreted depends on prior commitments to one or other of these hypotheses or to a theory of consciousness that is not neutral as to these hypotheses. One of these types of theory, namely vehicle theories, has difficulty accommodating the existence of confabulations and so allows for only the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. Because we cannot know that reports are not confabulations, vehicle theories are insufficient to explain OBEs.
there are a variety of well-known difficulties in using subjective reports as operationalisations of experience. Here I will focus on one particular problem: that of distinguishing veridical (valid) reports from confabulations. This problem has been discussed in detail for dream experiences (see Rosen, 2013 , for review) and delusions (e.g., Langdon & Bayne, 2010) . Here I argue that this problem has implications for theories of consciousness which have not been fully appreciated, using the case of bizarre self-experiences known as out-of-body experiences. Specifically I argue that a vehicle theory of consciousness, considered on its own, is insufficient to explain out-of-body experiences.
Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are a tricky, but useful, test case for theories of consciousness. They are tricky because many features of OBEs reported by subjects do not seem to be easily replicable and a substantial portion of the data regarding what OBEs are like is collected months or even years after the purported experience. It is no surprise then that experiences which are (relatively) easy to induce and control, such as those seen in change blindness or binocular rivalry experiments, are the favoured cases in the study of consciousness. But, it is the retrospective nature of OBE reports and the degree of individual variation around the core theme of the subject being separated from the body which has significant implications for the study of consciousness.
OBE reports vary in a number of drastic ways. Nevertheless they are all organised around a central theme: that the self or subject is felt to be external to the body. This central theme is common to every case and is inducible in controlled conditions (e.g., Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002) . As this is the most commonly replicated part of OBEs we have little reason to doubt such reports, or at least less reason than we have to doubt other aspects of the reports. What of the more elaborate variations on the theme? These do cluster into types around features such as autoscopy, but there are also some features of the reports which seem peculiar to individuals. Do these variations indicate a wide degree of individual variation in experience or are they post-hoc confabulations, stories told by subjects to themselves in an attempt to make sense of the core phenomenology? 1 As "confabulation" has several uses in the literature it is worth taking a moment to define the notion. Confabulations here are inaccurate additions made to reports of experience, offered honestly (likely in an attempt to make sense of an unusual experience), which refer to experiences the subject did not have. If a subject is dishonest, their report is not a confabulation. Not all errors in reports are confabulations; if a subject fails to mention something they did experience they are not confabulating.
Here I offer two hypotheses regarding the phenomenology and the reports of the phenomenology of OBEs. These hypotheses occupy the ends of a continuum of possibilities. The first hypothesis I call the "core phenomenology plus confabulation" hypothesis. It states that during OBEs all the subject really experiences is the core phenomenology of the self being separate from the body, all other details in the reports (and thus all individual differences in the reports) are confabulations. The second hypothesis I call the "elaborate phenomenology" hypothesis. On this hypothesis, all that subjects report about their OBEs reflect differences in what was really experienced and all individual differences in reports are due to differences in experience. I discuss what evidence can be brought to bear on the issue. I argue that there is no existent or possible evidence available that would be sufficient to favour one hypothesis over the other. The reason for this is, first, that how existent evidence is interpreted depends on prior commitments to one or other of these hypotheses. Both hypotheses can tell plausible stories to accommodate the known facts. This is not a problem of not having the right sort of evidence, but a problem of the interpretations of any relevant evidence here being theory dependent. Even imagined and highly idealised evidence could be interpreted to support either hypothesis depending on whether or not one has a prior commitment to a class of theories of consciousness known as vehicle theories or to another class known as functionalist theories. Vehicle theories have difficulty accommodating the existence of confabulations and so allow for only the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. Functionalist theories allow for confabulations, but suggest that the elaborate phenomenology and core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis are not empirically distinguishable hypotheses, because they do not describe different scenarios, rather they are different descriptions of the same thing. Because we cannot know that reports are not confabulations (as required by a pure vehicle theory), and because of the impossibility of distinguishing the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis from the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis, a functionalist account of OBEs is preferred.
Reports of the phenomenology of out-of-body experiences
What is it like to have an OBE? The experience is often defined as an experience in which the subject (or self, or their mind, or their centre of consciousness) appears to be in a location external to their body and of seeing their body and world from that external location (Blanke & Arzy, 2005, p. 16; Blanke & Dieguez, 2009, p. 303; Devinsky, Feldmann, Burrowes, & Bromfield, 1989 , p. 1080 Overney, Arzy, & Blanke, 2009, pp. 228-229) . I argue here that this definition gives a misleading picture as to how diverse OBEs can be. Without a clear picture of this diversity it is difficult to explicate how difficult it is to distinguish the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis from the core content plus confabulation hypothesis. This initial definition fits with favoured reports from the literature, such as:
I was standing before a small audience, not more than ten people, in a well-lit college class room, delivering a speech which was so well prepared that I could nearly recite it like a memorized poem. Without prior warning, I suddenly had the clear impression of observing myself from the outside, from a position more than a meter above my head and somewhat to the side: near the ceiling of the room. This impression probably did not persist for more than 15 seconds, but for that time, it was as though my "body" was down below the real "me," continuing to deliver the prepared speech, while "I" was watching from above. (as cited in Brugger, Regard, & Landis, 1997, p. 25; Grusser & Landis, 1991, pp. 298-299) However, such a definition is too narrow as it does not allow us to enumerate the features of OBEs which are common to every instance and the degree of individual variation in the experience.
Here are some reports of OBEs which turn up frequently in the literature that demonstrate the diversity of OBE reports: I was in bed and about to fall asleep when I had the distinct impression that "I" was at the ceiling level looking down at my body in the bed. I was very startled and frightened; immediately [afterward] I felt that, I was consciously back in the bed again. (as cited in Blanke & Arzy, 2005, p. 16; Irwin, 1985) Suddenly it was as if he saw himself in the bed in front of him. He felt as if he were at the other end of the room, as if he were floating in space below the ceiling in the corner facing the bed from where he could observe his own body in the bed … he saw his own completely immobile body in the bed; the eyes were closed. (as cited in Blanke & Arzy, 2005, p. 17; Lunn, 1970) Examples such as these highlight several common features of OBEs, such as autoscopy or self-seeing.
The richness of OBEs can be seen in reports such as:
When asked to describe what he meant by his body feeling empty, he said "it was a feeling like a part of me was missing, and this would move from my chest up to my head." He said that he would then feel as though he were ascending to the corner of the room. From there, he could look down at his body, while feeling very cold and light-headed. The body below lay motionless on the floor or bed, while the "mind above" could move around the house and see the other family members in various rooms. He clearly saw the body below; it was not transparent and did cast a shadow. The body was dressed in the same clothes he was wearing, but curiously always had combed hair even when he knew his hair was uncombed before the onset of the episode. He felt that the mind above and the body below shared all thoughts, feelings, and kinaesthesia, although in some unexplainable way they both took up separate physical spaces. (Devinsky et al., 1989 (Devinsky et al., , p. 1081 This report highlights different possible features of OBEs, such as the experience of travelling away from the body and the difference between the seen body and the state the subject knows it to be in, in this case the neatness of the subject's hair (another common example is the seen body appearing a different age; Lopez & Blanke, 2007) . This subject seems to have an experience of moving about his local environment, other subjects reporting travels give rather different accounts of their experiences:
... the next thing I knew I was floating just below the ceiling. I could see myself lying there. I wasn't scared; it was too interesting. I saw myself jerking and overheard my boss telling someone to "punch the time-card out" and that she was going with me to the hospital. Next thing, I was in space and could see Earth. I felt a hand on my left shoulder, and when I went to turn around, I couldn't. Then, I looked down and I had no legs; I just saw stars. I stayed there for a while until some inner voice told me to go back to the body. I didn't want to go because it was gorgeous up there, it was warm-not like heat, but security. Next thing, I woke up in the emergency room. (Devinsky et al., 1989 (Devinsky et al., , p. 1082 This case is interesting because of the apparent distance travelled in the experience, and because of the subject's surprise that she didn't seem to have a complete body on that travel. Distance travelled need not be at one or other of these extremes, other subjects report experiences of being over a street or field (Overney et al., 2009, p. 230) . Most importantly in each of these narratives we see descriptions of apparently strikingly different experiences. Just what is the extent of the variation in patients' descriptions? Blackmore (1984) used a broader definition of OBEs in a postal survey of a random sample of people. In asking about OBEs she phrased her question as:
Have you ever had an experience in which you felt that "you" were located "outside of" or "away from" your physical body; that is the feeling that your consciousness, mind or centre of awareness was in a different place from your physical body? If you have trouble answering this question then you probably have not had the experience so please answer "No". (Blackmore, 1984, p. 244 ; this phrasing was introduced by Palmer, 1979) We see in this question that Blackmore offers few limits on the details of the experience, most notably that she does not exclude experiences in which the subject's own body is not seen. Blackmore found a high degree of variation amongst the experiences described by the 12% of respondents who reported at least one OBE and who thus get the fun classification of being an "OBEr". Of the OBErs, 44% described the experience as like being sober and awake with 12% finding it similar to some form of intoxication (18% were actually intoxicated at the time of the experience). Others felt the experience was more dream-like. Forty-four percent of OBErs experienced themselves as travelling away from the body, the remainder did not. Visual experience was strikingly variable, with 46% not noticing their body, 8% trying but failing to find it, only 24% reported seeing their body and it looking like their body, 18% reported seeing "their body" but it looking different from normal. I will return to some examples from this last group below. Subjects who report this kind of experience identify the seen body as their own; it feels like their own, even when it does not look like their own (Brugger, Blanke, Regard, Bradford, & Landis, 2006, p. 666; Cheyne & Girard, 2009, p. 210) . Similarly, when subjects were asked to describe what the self (which was separated from the body) was like, 69% state that they experience a complete second body, 12% that they seem to be only a point in space, 3% a second body that was somehow different from their real body, and 3% as an extended but non-bodily shape. There is also variation in visual phenomenology, with around half of OBErs describing their experiences as like normal, and the remainder as either clearer or dimmer than usual (Blackmore, 1984, pp. 231-232) .
This covers only some of the more interesting variations in what OBErs report. The experiences as reported by subjects are much more varied than the initial definition allows, strikingly more than half of this sample report not seeing their own body. This finding has been replicated with Cheyne and Girard (2009, p. 205) reporting that 51% of their sample of OBErs who experienced an OBE in the context of sleep paralysis did not see their own body. As more than half of subjects seem not to experience autoscopy during an OBE it seems that we ought not even list autoscopy as a typical, let alone defining, feature of OBEs as suggested by Brugger and colleagues (1997, p. 21) . The lesson then is not merely that we need to change our definition of OBEs, so that we do not build too much into them, but also the extent and type of variation in the experience must be accounted for in explaining what it is like for subjects to have them.
We should not, however, assume that Blackmore's (1984) study provides a comprehensive list of this variation. The variation discovered in this study was limited by the closed questions posed in the survey. As research into OBEs has continued, more variation and commonalities have been discovered. It is common, for example, for subjects to report disturbed vestibular sensations, such as rotation or floating (Cheyne & Girard, 2009, p. 202) , although these may be deemed less noteworthy (by the subject) than the visual phenomenology (Blanke & Arzy, 2005, p. 18) . When specifically asked, as many as 90% of OBErs report such experiences (Cheyne & Girard, 2009, p. 205) suggesting this is a common part of OBEs. In contrast, some subjects, as many as 32% of OBErs in Terhune's study, report no visual experiences at all during an OBE (Terhune, 2009, p. 238) suggesting that visual experiences are less common.
Autoscopy, or "self-seeing," whilst not as common as assumed in some definitions, is a regularly reported feature of OBEs. In folklore it is often assumed that autoscopy along with all other visual experiences in OBEs are veridical representations of the world as if from the subject's apparently disembodied location. However, this is not uniformly reported by OBErs. We have already seen some departure from this above. Blanke and colleagues (2002) describe cases where the experience of autoscopy seemed either incomplete or bizarre. At different times the same subject reported an experience in which only the lower half of her body was seen and another in which the limbs of a complete body appeared to shorten or lengthen as they were attended to (see also Blanke & Arzy, 2005, p. 19) . There is also variation in what the seen body is described as doing; most commonly, it is seen to be lying still (which would be consistent with what the subject is actually doing at the time of the experience in most circumstances) or performing a stereotyped action (Brugger et al., 1997, p. 24) . For example:
At the time of the accident, she "left her body" and saw from above that it was lying in a pool of blood in the car. She then saw herself get up and walk around the car and begin banging on the driver's window. She felt that her mind was completely separate from her body and that she did not share any emotion, intellect, or kinaesthesia with the body below. She observed a man who instructed her body to get back into the car, which the body did, and it assumed its original position. A girlfriend who was at the scene of the accident later told her that she was found in the position she described (the patient never having left the car). (Devinsky et al., 1989 (Devinsky et al., , p. 1081 Similarly, other features may be added to the visual world. Describing an OBE in the context of migraine, one subject reported that:
She saw herself lying on a railroad track with a train passing over her [as drawn the train appears the size of a toy train -GC]. To her left side, against the bedroom wall, were irregular, multicolored scotomas. (Hachinski, Porchawka, & Steele, 1973, p. 576) When autoscopy does occur in an OBE it has some distinct characteristics. We have established that there is variation in what is seen, i.e., what the subject's body looks like, but importantly, unlike related experiences named "heautoscopy" in which subjects have difficulty knowing which body they are located in, the subject's visuo-spatial perspective is well-defined and stable (Brugger et al., 1997, p. 24) . Similarly, the subject's perspective is external to the body, as seen in the fact that OBErs typically do not report seeing the body as if it were a reflection (Brugger et al., 1997, p. 24 ; for a possible counter example see case 2 in Devinsky et al., 1989) .
Despite all this variation in the experience, there is something in common across OBEs; namely the feeling of the self/subject as being separate from the body (Terhune, 2009, p. 236) . In the spirit of Brugger and colleagues (1997) I will call this the core phenomenology of an OBE. It is core in that it provides a minimal guide to describing and asking about OBEs; it is common to all reports of OBEs. In contrast to the core phenomenology there is also what I shall call the elaborated phenomenology of OBEs. This includes visual phenomenology, autoscopy, feelings of travelling great distances (Girard & Cheyne, 2004) , olfactory (e.g., "a smell like death," Devinsky et al., 1989 Devinsky et al., , p. 1081 ) and gustatory experiences (e.g., a "nasty taste," Devinsky et al., 1989 Devinsky et al., , p. 1081 , and the like.
We have then a picture of what OBEs are like as reported by subjects. We know what is common between instances of OBEs and what varies. How, then, are we to make sense of these reports and what implications does this have for the study of consciousness? In the next section I introduce the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis and the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis as two ends of a continuum of possible ways to understand reports of OBEs.
Two interpretations of out-of-body experiences

Option 1: Core phenomenology and confabulation
In order to be transformed from an experience itself to a report i.e., for us to operationalise consciousness, a process of interpretation must take place (Dennett, 1991, pp. 70-72) . This in itself shouldn't surprise anyone; in transforming some information from one representational medium to another an interpretive process is always needed.
Despite this act of interpretation, we can continue to take the subject absolutely seriously in at least two ways. First, as Dennett suggests, we treat the subject as absolutely authoritative regarding their own hypothesis about their own experience (Dennett, 1991, p. 96) . Second, we can attempt a science of experience types. Due to the unfortunate nature of (real or apparent) temporal dynamics we can never return to a particular experience in order to further investigate its nature. Even if we could return to the time of the experience, we could not do so without changing the experience. One popular approach to working within these limitations has been to record experiences with enough common features for them to be considered a type. This is what we have been doing with OBEs. Once classified, we can ask about what features instances of the type seem to have in common. These common experiences then constitute our first formulation of the phenomena to be explained.
Taking OBEs as our example we see that there are several common themes in reports. These are already treated as subtypes by several researchers and in this we may follow their lead. First is the phenomenon of autoscopy. The common feature of this experience to be explained is seeing one's own body. We may also then wish to subtype autoscopy further depending on the appearance of the seen body. For example, whether or not the seen body appears as the subject is now or differently, and depending on whether actions of the seen body appear reversed as in a mirror or not. Second, we could type OBEs around whether or not any visual experience is involved, or the quality of that experience. Third we could propose a subtype based on the presence of experiences of travel. However, all that is essential to OBEs is that the core phenomenology is the feeling of spatial separation between oneself and one's body.
Here is what we might think, given the current state of evidence, what constitutes an OBE. But, as we have seen, this doesn't cover anywhere near all the individual variation in these experiences. What of the claims in reports of suddenly being in outer space, or of travelling around the house? Do different subjects hallucinate different travels or do they confabulate different stories to make sense of sensations of motion?
The evidence here is sketchy. Reports like this, we have seen, are unusually individual. Unlike the core phenomenology of out-of-body experiences these reports are apparently not inducible and not repeatable. Experiences of travel, whilst common in retrospective reports, do not appear to occur so frequently when experiences are induced or reported very soon after occurrence, i.e., in such cases subjects report feeling as though they are separated from their body, but not that they seem to travel to a different location such as outer space (cf. Blanke et al., 2002; Overney et al., 2009) . Because of this, we have reason to question the occurrence of the experience. What's more, we have an alternative explanation of the reports that does not tie them to an apparently unrepeatable experience. We might hypothesise that such reports are attempts by the subjects to make sense of their odd experience, namely the core OBE. They are errors imported into the narrative in an attempt to put into words a very difficult-to-describe experience. This stands out in particular because OBEs themselves are not shared by everyone. As such, there is no developed vocabulary for describing the experience. A prediction of this approach is that reports of commonly shared experiences will contain fewer of these errors. When different subjects are able to share experience of the same object they can discuss that object and their experience of it, thus developing a shared vocabulary. In contrast, when experiences are not about an external object which multiple subjects can experience, subjects lack a common reference object to discuss, thus reducing the ways in which errors may be corrected. For example, dreams, hallucinations, and hypnotically induced experiences should contain many such errors, whereas reports of visual scenes, music recordings, or the intentions behind another's action should contain fewer errors or confabulations because these are shared experiences.
Consider again the distinction between core and elaborated phenomenology. We have the best evidence that it is the core phenomenology which is experienced and less evidence for all other aspects of the reports. This sets our first hypothesis: the subject only experiences the core phenomenology and all other apparent experiences reported in the narratives are not experiences but confabulations applied by the subject in an attempt to make sense of the core phenomenology for themselves and for others.
As such, when our subject says that she experienced herself in space, the advocate of this hypothesis would say that she was wrong and had no such experience. By hypothesis the experience as she describes it is the best way available to her to make sense of what she actually did experience, namely floating and disembodiment. This is part of subjects' occasional, context-specific tendency to report what should have plausibly been a part of their experience given what else they know, rather than what was actually experienced (Schwitzgebel, 2008) .
Option 2: Elaborate phenomenology
This is by no means the only interpretation available to us in attempting to understand the variation seen in reports of OBEs. We might hypothesise that there is significant variation in the experiences of different OBErs and that these differences are more or less accurately reported by subjects. The core phenomenology is shared by all OBErs and some other aspects like travel and autoscopy are not. But, the fact that these features are not shared by all does not imply that they are not shared by some. With this option we might be tempted to take the clustering of OBEs into subtypes around the presence of features such as autoscopy or travelling more seriously than we did for the first hypothesis. Under this second hypothesis, there are different types of OBEs, e.g., OBEs with autoscopy, OBEs with travel, etc., which involve different clusters of experience and need somewhat different explanations.
These two hypotheses seem to set the extremes of a position; it might be that some variation is in experience and other variation is in sense-making confabulations. However, I will argue below that there is no way of interpreting evidence to distinguish these hypotheses without first assuming one of the hypotheses to be true. If we cannot distinguish the extreme versions of the hypotheses we have little hope for distinguishing more nuanced positions between the extremes.
There is a third possibility as well. Perhaps all that is reported in OBEs are confabulations. 2 That is to say, perhaps subjects never have OBEs, but nevertheless feel compelled to report them, to us and to themselves, perhaps to make sense of an ill-defined strange feeling, or perhaps it starts out as an act of imagination which later becomes indistinguishable from a memory. Such a hypothesis, call this the confabulation only hypothesis, may seem especially appealing when we note how rare and strange OBEs are. However, when we consider other rare and/or bizarre experiences we standardly take the occurrence of the experience to be probable if the experience can be induced by experimental manipulation and there is sufficient similarity between reports that they can be sorted into types. For example, we take reports of experiences from subjects after the consumption of LSD or ketamine as probably valid reports of experience because the experience seems to be induced by our manipulation. Similarly for the rubber hand illusion. On the other hand, when a large number of patients paralysed or severely weakened by brain injury nevertheless report that they are able to move normally (as in anosognosia for hemiplegia), we commonly take this as reflecting a real experience of the body being able to move as before the injury. Both of these standards (inducibility and clustering) are met in the case of OBEs. OBEs seem to be inducible by transcranial magnetic stimulation (Blanke et al., 2002) and, as we have seen, many subjects provide reports organised around the theme of the subject feeling that they are separate from their body. Considered by the standards usually used to judge the likelihood of reports of rare and bizarre experiences being valid, it seems most likely that at least something of an OBE is actually experienced and not merely confabulated. Although the confabulation only hypothesis might still be true, by these standards it is substantially less likely to be true than either the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis or the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis. Further evidence would be needed to place the confabulation only hypothesis on par with the other two. In the absence of such evidence I will focus on the elaborate phenomenology and the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypotheses for this paper.
Are the interpretations distinguishable?
We have two, apparently competing, hypotheses regarding the nature of out-of-body experiences. In order to account for the core content of the experience, the elaborated content, and the high degree of individual difference in that content, these two apparently different options are available. I will return to these hypotheses several times, so for ease of reference let us number and name them.
1. Subjects only experience the core content and then confabulate a story in attempt to make sense of this bizarre experience. Call this the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis. 2. Each subject has a radically different OBE and errors are not (or not necessarily) introduced in reporting that experience. Call this the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis.
What evidence could be marshalled in an attempt to distinguish the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis from the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis? There are three potential sources of evidence which may be relevant here. We can search for indirect evidence by considering how OBEs are constructed, for direct evidence in what subjects report about the experience, or indirect evidence in the brains of the subjects. Let's consider these possibilities in turn.
One reason we may favour the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis is the extent to which OBEs seem to depend on the prior knowledge and commitments of subjects, i.e., the extent to which they appear theory based. Murray and Fox (2005) report that OBErs are more dissatisfied with their bodies and more anxious about their appearance to others than non-OBErs. Overney and colleagues (2009) report an OBEr who was significantly better at mental rotation of body images than controls. Blackmore (1984) found that OBErs were significantly more likely to believe in life after death and extra sensory perception (ESP) than non-OBErs. If these factors influence whether or not a subject has an OBE, then we might think that a lot of construction goes into generating OBEs. At this point an advocate of the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis may suggest that these factors more plausibly play a causal role in constructing narratives than in constructing experiences. On such an account, reports would be theory based, with confabulations in OBE reports arising from such theories.
Of course we will want to take account of the fact that correlational data like that in the three studies mentioned above does not give a direction of causation. Might some of these links be explained by changes induced by OBEs? Indeed some subjects do report that having an OBE changed their beliefs around life after death and Metzinger (2005) even suggests that OBEs are the source of the cultural idea of a soul. Despite appearances, when it comes to distinguishing between the above two hypotheses, these findings are irrelevant. If OBE reports turned out not to be theory based then both hypotheses would need some further story to explain individual differences in OBEs. If the above kinds of commitments and capacity do influence the construction of OBEs then either hypothesis is equally supported. These other mental states either contribute to the construction of a confabulatory narrative or to the construction of a rich experience. How such facts are interpreted depends on whether we favour the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis or the core content plus confabulation hypothesis, as such evidence of what other mental representations or capacities influence the construction of OBEs cannot help us decide between these options.
Perhaps it would be more helpful to look more closely at subjects' reports under controlled circumstances. The best way to do this would be to induce OBEs and ask subjects about them as they occur, thus minimising the influence of errors in memory on the reports. We might then conclude that what is reported under such circumstances is what is really experienced by subjects and anything which only occurs in retrospective reports is merely confabulated. I suggested above that this might help us drop some features of reports, but could this settle the issue between our two hypotheses? No. Either of these hypotheses is compatible with what is reported under such circumstances. We have seen that when OBEs are induced and subjects asked about them, that they do indeed report more than the core phenomenology. For example, whilst travel experiences may not occur in such cases, autoscopy definitely can (Blanke et al., 2002) . This might seem to support an elaborate phenomenology hypothesis, but it does not. Here the advocate of a core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis need only point out that in asking the subject about the experience we are inviting them to make sense of their experience and translate it into words, thus bringing about the confabulations needed to get autoscopy into OBE reports. Either hypothesis is compatible with the facts of OBEs here.
We have seen that neither hypothesis can be distinguished by what immediate reports of OBEs are like. Is this an in-principle or contingent matter? Suppose it had turned out that whenever OBEs were induced and immediately reported on, subjects only reported the core phenomenology-wouldn't that support the view that OBEs consisted of a core phenomenology which subjects then make sense of later with a confabulatory narrative? No, because the advocate of an elaborate phenomenology view need only suggest that by asking about the experience too early, the experimenter fixes a thin phenomenology before it has had a chance to be elaborated. By asking about the experience during the process of induction the processes that would normally elaborate the phenomenology are blocked by bringing the core phenomenology alone into focus. Even if immediate reports of induced OBEs were only of the core phenomenology (which they are not) both hypotheses would be consistent with this and so the hypotheses cannot be distinguished by these data. Again, how real or possible evidence is interpreted here depends upon which hypothesis is favoured; as such, this evidence cannot help us decide between these hypotheses.
The theory dependence of evidence
Above, I argued that some existent or possible evidence seems potentially helpful for distinguishing the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis from the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. However, this (real or possible) evidence seems equally compatible with either hypothesis. Perhaps then we need to step away from the facts and into the realm of imagining future discoveries. Is there possible evidence, of a different sort than has been gathered to date, which could distinguish these hypotheses? Perhaps some super high-resolution (in time and space) brain scanner could distinguish these accounts. Although this might seem plausible, I argue here that should it be possible to obtain such evidence, how it is interpreted is itself theory dependent. The same (imagined) data would mean very different things to the advocate of a vehicle theory of consciousness than to a functionalist. This is particularly pertinent here as the advocate of a (pure) vehicle theory is committed to the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis, as such accounts lack the resources to accommodate confabulations.
The term "vehicle theory" was first introduced by O'Brien and Opie (1997), although similar proposals that identify consciousness with a particular medium of representation are seen in Mangan (1993 Mangan ( , 1998 and Lloyd (1992) . Vehicle theories do not identify consciousness with a set of functions of mental representations, rather they identify consciousness with a particular manner of representation. This is explicated by O'Brien and Opie using the distinction between "explicit" and "inexplicit" forms of mental representation. For them, "explicit" representations are those for which for every item represented there is a physically distinct vehicle. Inexplicit representations are those stored dispositionally (i.e., as a disposition to produce an explicit representation) or "embodied in the device' , 1997, pp. 279-280, 1999, p. 956) . If this is to be applied to biological minds then explicit representations will be those whose vehicles are constituted by patterns of activity across layers of neurons and inexplicit representations will be the dispositions of sets of synaptic connections to produce particular patterns of activity. 4 Here I do not wish to tie my discussion to O'Brien and Opie's specific hypothesis regarding what distinguishes conscious from unconscious mental representations. It is possible that O'Brien and Opie are wrong that conscious representations are distinguished by being "explicit" in their sense, whilst some other vehicle theory is true. It could be, for example, that a representation falls within a certain quality space (Clark, 1993; Schier, 2009) . Instead, let's focus on the hypothesis that consciousness is a particular way of representing the world (rather than something done with those representations). What would such a view suggest about distinguishing experience and confabulation in OBEs?
At first glance, vehicle theories, on the whole, would seem to predict that experience and confabulation should be distinguishable in OBEs. If representations are of a certain type, say explicit representations, then identifying all of the vehicles of that type and their content will tell us what a subject is conscious of. All the contents represented in the right way will be conscious and all others will not be. For any content where we have concerns about whether or not it is a confabulation of experience we just look to see (with our futuristic super brain scanner) if that content is represented in the right way. If the core content plus confabulation hypothesis is true only the content of the core phenomenology will be represented in the medium of consciousness. In contrast, if the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis is true, then all (or at least much more) of the content of the report will be represented in this way. Does this mean, then, that the vehicle theorist is committed to arbitrarily declaring that certain content cannot be represented unconsciously? No, of course not. Instead they must be committed to the claim that the nature of the vehicle of unconscious representation will be different from the nature of the vehicle of conscious representation. However this difference is understood, be it using O'Brien and Opie's explicit versus inexplicit distinction, or something else, the difference in representational medium should be, in principle, identifiable. For example, if we take O'Brien and Opie's criterion then all the contents which are explicitly represented at any time will be identifiable as stable patterns of activity across layers of neurons. From their perspective, all that is inexplicitly represented won't be identifiable as, by definition, inexplicit vehicles are not physically (spatially/temporally) distinct objects. Nonetheless, even on their view, it should be possible to identify all the conscious contents (O'Brien & Opie, 1999, p. 945 ). This will thereby make it possible to distinguish what reports are valid reports of experience and which are confabulations by identifying which contents are represented in the right "conscious" way in the brain (O'Brien & Opie, 1999, p. 959) .
The problem for vehicle theories arises when we attempt to specify confabulations. Vehicle theorists to date have focused their discussion on the difference between conscious and unconscious representations (see, e.g., O'Brien & Opie, 1999; Schier, 2009) . But, it is unclear which type of representations confabulations could be. Take for a moment the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis. Do subjects consciously or unconsciously represent travel or seeing their own body? Granted that if this is a confabulation it is not the case that they experience travel or autoscopy, for by definition they haven't; such reports are included in an attempt to make sense of the experience. However, it seems equally unpalatable to say that subjects unconsciously represent travel and autoscopy, as they sincerely believe they have had such experiences, which suggests that the personal narrative contains representations which are, or at least are caused by, representations which should be considered conscious.
Perhaps, then, vehicle theories could be expanded to include a third type of representing vehicle? Perhaps we need an account of conscious, unconscious, and confabulatory representations? This needn't be seen as an ad hoc move, we don't have a complete account of mental representation, perhaps confabulations are good evidence that we need to consider a more diverse classificatory system. What then might confabulatory representations be, according to a vehicle theory?
The obvious suggestion would be that confabulatory representations are those that are represented in the medium of the language production system, but not in the consciousness medium which would be identified with activity in other parts of the brain. Well this won't do, as there is a sense in which all reports will be represented in the language production system. More importantly, this proposal would preclude the possibility of a representation in the language system having a top-down influence to produce a representation of, say, travel or autoscopy, elsewhere in the brain.
An alternative may be to suggest that confabulations are representations in the language system that seem to be reports of experience, but which are not caused by experience, at least not as veridical reports are caused. This too will be a distinction which is hard to elaborate, but more importantly it is not a vehicle theory proposal. Vehicle theories such as O'Brien and Opie's distinguish the media of representation by the intrinsic properties of the vehicles (O'Brien & Opie, 1997 , 1999 , for example being explicit or inexplicit. The present proposal in contrast picks out a relational property of particular vehicles, that is, what causes them to be elicited, not a property intrinsic to the vehicles themselves.
It seems then that the vehicle theorist will have great difficulty in fitting confabulations into their account. Specifically it seems that confabulations cannot be classed as either conscious or unconscious representations and they do not obviously form a third class of mental representation which could be distinguished by the properties a vehicle theorist could accept. 5 As such, a vehicle theory, contra to initial appearances, does not seem able to use such possible data to distinguish the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis from the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. Instead it is committed to the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis, due to difficulties in allowing for confabulations. What this imagined evidence means for distinguishing these hypotheses is not theory neutral.
The main alternative to a vehicle theory of consciousness is a functionalist theory. Unlike vehicle theories, functionalist theories identify consciousness with certain kinds of processing of mental representations. The vehicle theorist hypothesises that the difference between a conscious and unconscious representation is the medium in which content is represented. In contrast, the functionalist hypothesises that the difference between a conscious and unconscious mental representation is how that representation is processed. Prominent functionalist theories are the global workspace model (Baars, 1988; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) and the multiple drafts model (Dennett, 1991) .
A functionalist approach to consciousness would interpret the imagined facts about what is observed in a super brain scanner differently from how they would be interpreted by a vehicle theorist. Whilst the vehicle theorist would interpret such information in light of the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis, the functionalist would see such evidence as irrelevant for distinguishing the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis from the core content plus confabulation hypothesis.
To see why, consider what it is that our two hypotheses agree on. Both take it that there is some representation of the subject as separate from their body. This is common to every OBE but in many cases there is more to the experience than this. The question is whether these elaborations are added to the experience, or just what subjects say about the experience. What could a futuristic brain scanner tell us about this? Well, we'd hope it could identify a particular pattern of activity that is a vehicle representing the subject as separate from the body. It could also identify patterns of activity that are vehicles for the content of the elaborations should they occur. Now, when the first of these vehicles, the one that represents the core content, occurs this is the earliest time at which the subject could experience the core phenomenology (Dennett, 1991, p. 124) . But, unless we are to arbitrarily declare that such a representation can never occur unconsciously, a functionalist would argue there is no reason to think that the tokening of this vehicle as observed by our super scanner constitutes the subject becoming aware of the core phenomenology. All that we can determine is that the subject's awareness of this vehicle (and their having of the core phenomenology) occurs somewhere between its tokening and its being reported by the subject. Later on we might see evidence that the agent is forming the utterance, "I feel like I have left my body," meaning that the content is experienced. However, this doesn't tell us when it shifted from being unconsciously represented to being experienced; it only tells us that it is experienced, not when. Similarly, elaborations must occur during this same time. If they occurred later, subjects would spontaneously report the core phenomenology and then the elaborations and this is not what happens (similarly, if the elaborations occurred earlier than this, they wouldn't be elaborations). As such, our super brain scanner couldn't identify a time period during which the core phenomenology "comes to be experienced." At some point during this period the elaborations are formed. Since there is no non-arbitrary way to state that when during this period the core phenomenology "becomes conscious," there is no non-arbitrary way to state whether or not the elaborations are formed before or after this. For a functionalist, even data from an imagined super scanner could not distinguish our hypotheses.
For the functionalist there is no evidence that could tell us whether our OBErs experience only the core phenomenology and then confabulate in an attempt to make sense of this odd experience or if they have quite distinct and elaborate phenomenology.
As Dennett (1991 Dennett ( , 1995 has argued, by collapsing the apparent distinction between adding content to an experience and merely adding it to judgements about the experience, this kind of scenario is predicted and explained by a functionalist account of consciousness. On such a view, whilst mental representations of some content are distinct entities that should be identifiable in brain activity, consciousness of that content is just a way or set of ways of using the content in the broader cognitive system. Functionalist accounts will differ in precisely which uses of the content constitute consciousness and we can leave the specifics of such use for empirical discovery (see Baars, 1988; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 for specific suggestions), but we might think that relevant uses will be to do with reporting, otherwise acting on, and remembering the content. If this is true, use of content constitutes being conscious of it.
For OBEs our question is this: does the core content of OBEs become elaborated (a) before the content is experienced, thus meaning subjects experience elaborate phenomenology or (b) after the content is experienced by a process of confabulation? In a functionalist account of consciousness these are not distinct options. The elaborative/ constructive/confabulative processes are part of the use of the core content. As such they partially constitute consciousness of that content. It makes no sense to ask if these processes take place before or after consciousness of the core content because they are consciousness of the core content. If this is correct, the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis and the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis are not distinct options at all; they are different ways of saying that the core content is elaborated during processes which constitute being conscious of it. It then follows that because these are not distinct options, we would expect that they would not be distinguishable empirically, which is consistent with the available evidence, and, as we have seen, a plausible interpretation of this kind can be offered for imagined idealised future discoveries, regardless of what they are.
For a vehicle theory to be true it seems there must be evidence for the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis over the core phenomenology plus confabulation hypothesis, because such accounts do not allow for confabulations. However, it seems that there is no evidence which could exist that would show this without first assuming a vehicle theory. Although it is possible for a vehicle theorist to explain away apparent confabulations in OBEs, thus making the account possible, there is no evidence which can show that this is the right approach. In contrast, functionalist accounts, broadly speaking, seem to predict the difficulties in empirically distinguishing the core content plus confabulation hypothesis from the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. For a functionalist these are not truly distinct options. As such, this analysis suggests that a vehicle theory is insufficient to explain OBEs.
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that out-of-body experiences do have implications for our theory of consciousness. In attempting to understand individual variation in reports of OBEs, two apparently different hypotheses were put forward. Either OBEs consist of a core phenomenology representing the subject as distinct from their body and variation in reports is to be explained through a consideration of confabulatory attempts to make sense of this phenomenology, or there is rich variation in the elaborate phenomenology of OBEs.
However, these apparently distinct hypotheses cannot be distinguished without assuming one or other hypothesis or without assuming a vehicle theory, which is committed to the elaborate phenomenology hypothesis. As such we cannot rule out the possibility that reports of OBEs contain confabulations, as required by a vehicle theory, in a non-question-begging way. Therefore, a consideration of the difficulties in distinguishing confabulations from veridical reports in OBEs suggests a vehicle theory is insufficient to account for OBEs.
like to have an experience (Block, 2007) . "Phenomenology" is not being used to refer to a particular tradition following Husserl which focuses on the study of the structure of experience from the first-person perspective (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2005) . 2. My thanks go to anonymous reviewers for this point. 3. O'Brien and Opie are likely right that classicists can't take their version of a vehicle theory seriously, because in the classical computational framework there is significantly less room for inexplicit representations to contribute to cognition (O'Brien & Opie, 1997 , p. 276, 1999 . 4. One common objection (see, e.g., commentaries accompanying O' Brien & Opie, 1999) raised to this particular vehicle theory is that there seem to be many explicit representations of which we are never conscious. For example, it seems we are never conscious of motor commands or what is represented by patterns of activity in the LGN. Several replies are available to O'Brien and Opie here. They may hypothesise that such activity never becomes stable enough to be identifiable as a discreet physical object, hence it never becomes a vehicle of explicit representation. Alternatively they could limit the explanatory target of their account to the phenomenal qualities of mental states, without offering an account of which of these qualities are available for report. I will not focus on this further here as, for my purposes, the important feature of vehicle theories is the claim that consciousness is a specific medium of representation, thus my argument will apply to vehicle theories in general, not O'Brien and Opie's in particular. 5. Much of O'Brien and Opie's argument that classicism can't support a vehicle theory is based on the idea that symbols are typed in classical symbols by their relational, not their intrinsic properties, (see especially O'Brien & Opie, 1999, pp. 949-953) .
